Conceptually, we deduce our definition of legitimation strategies from David Easton's work 10 and distinguish between three types of constituencies from which international institutions seek legitimacy. We show that international institutions do not only strive for legitimacy from member states but also from civil servants working for international institutions' bureaucracies and the broader public. Our core argument is that international institutions employ different legitimation strategies depending on the addressed constituency. Analyzing these three types of legitimation strategies and their interaction more systematically will enrich our understanding of how the communication, behavior, and institutional transformation of international institutions unfold and why some institutions are more successful than others in managing their legitimacy.
The article is organized as follows: subsequent to an overview about the major themes of legitimacy research in IR, we point out that legitimacy is the result of an interactive process that relies both on the bottom-up attribution of legitimacy to international institutions by social constituencies and on legitimacy claims made by political elites. Second, we situate legitimation strategies in the context of empirical legitimacy theory and provide a conceptualization that takes into account different addressees of legitimation. Third, we demonstrate the empirical applicability and relevance of our approach by applying it to the analysis of legitimation strategies normative perspective, legitimacy research is interested in the rightfulness or acceptability of political authority based on normative criteria such as democracy or justice. While the applied normative standards may vary, these approaches invariably presume legitimacy to be 'a property or characteristic of regimes which satisfy criteria laid out by the observer'. 16 Researchers are either concerned with the prescriptive formulation of criteria for the acceptability of international institution's rule 17 or with the diagnostic evaluation of existing institutions against the backdrop of normative standards.
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Our contribution is rooted in empirical legitimacy research which draws on
Weber's work on legitimate rule 19 and is concerned with the social recognition of international institutions by those subjected to their rule or, to be more precise, 'with the extent and the (reproduction) of the kind of regime support that goes by the name of legitimacy'. 20 This research assumes an observer perspective analyzing the legitimacy claims and beliefs of rulers and ruled, as well as practices and strategies which underpin 15 Buchanan and Keohane, ' 30 We define international institutions broadly to include regional and global organization, clubs of governance, regimes, and networks governed by formal international agreements.
legitimation. 31 Legitimacy is and can only be the result of an interactive political process between rulers and ruled. 32 These processes of legitimation culminating in the (non-)attribution of legitimacy comprise both the bottom-up attribution of legitimacy by social constituencies and the top-down cultivation of legitimacy by rulers. 33 At the core of this interactive understanding of legitimation lies that individuals do not attribute legitimacy to international institutions in a societal vacuum but are constantly influenced by many factors such as international institutions' policy outputs, external shocks, and legitimacy claims by a plethora of actors. 34 As regards the latter, Weber emphasized a top-down perspective on legitimation processes: 'Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal interests as a basis for its continuance. In addition, every such system attempts to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy'. 35 These legitimacy claims are 'the lifeblood of politics of legitimation and such politics is essential to the cultivation and maintenance of an actor's or institution's legitimacy'. 36 We follow these suggestions and focus on the role of international institutions and their representatives in legitimation processes. In order to reconstruct the legitimacy evaluations and principles that prevail in different constituencies of legitimation and to better understand the communication and behavior of international institutions, it is necessary to take their legitimation strategies into account. The reason why these efforts can be expected to play an import role in processes of legitimation is given by Easton, who argues that a few powerful actors commanding the necessary organizational resources and skills may be able to make their legitimacy claims hold greater weight than those of the unorganized millions. substantial legitimacy gains. 57 Rather than treating this distinction as categorical, it
should be regarded as a continuum in which discursive legitimacy claims and substantive institutional adaptation constitute the extreme points.
Producers and addressees of legitimation strategies
Having delineated the concept of legitimation strategies, the following section specifies the agents of legitimation and their addressees, i.e. the constituencies of legitimation.
Given the focus of the article, we concentrate on top-level representatives of international institutions as producers of legitimation strategies. Ideal-typically, this group encompasses Director-Generals and Deputy Directors General. The matter is more complex in international institutions which only have a marginal or no independent bureaucratic staff. The G8, the G20, and similar club formats do not have full-fledged secretariats comparable to other international institutions. Nonetheless, they apply legitimation strategies. Here, our own research shows that the annually rotating chairs assume the role of producers of legitimation strategies.
That said, the main argument of this section is that there are three legitimacy constituencies which may hold different normative parameters on the rightful authority of international institutions and which, therefore, demand for different types of legitimation strategies. 58 Contrary to common wisdom, international institutions do not only have to bolster their legitimacy in the eyes of member governments 59 but would do well to also address the normative expectations of their administrative staff and the wider public. Clearly, international institution cannot fully satisfy the normative expectations of all of the three addresses. Rather, legitimation strategies have to balance different demands. 60 The failure to do so is likely to result in failure of individual strategies or even in the emergence of legitimacy crises. 61 In the following, we differentiate three types of legitimation strategies: intergovernmental, bureaucratic, and public legitimation strategies. Empirical research on intergovernmental legitimation strategies focuses on international institutions' capacity to address joint problems and generate public goods. 67 Effectiveness is often seen as the primary source of international institutions' legitimacy 68 and most research focuses, thus, on discursive and institutional legitimation strategies addressing this dimension of international institutions. 72 Consequently, national civil servants being in charge for the G8 and the G20 are the addressees of legitimation strategies of both national governments and the international institution's chairs. This multiple position has been confirmed during our interview with the head of the British G8 sherpa team in 2013. 73 Weber, 'Economy and Society', p. 212. 74 Weber, 'Economy and Society', p. 213. Although not discussed explicitly by Easton, 'A Systems Analysis of Political Life',p. 154., who does not specify the relevant constituencies of legitimation, we claim that the diffuse support for international institutions by their staff member -for instance backed by the belief in the rationality and legality of bureaucracies -is an important element of their legitimacy.
Intergovernmental legitimation strategies

Bureaucratic legitimation strategies
authority of the institution, making it well equipped to operate. 75 Hence, the aim of bureaucratic legitimation strategies is to cultivate positive legitimacy beliefs within the institution's staff, for instance by generating conformity with virtues of formalized procedure and the abstract codification of impersonal rules. and definitively, the degree to which the analyzed legitimation strategies have affected the perceptions of both institutions constituencies.
The G8 after the financial meltdown in 2008
The institutional reform of the G8 in the aftermath of the financial crash and the way it has been communicated to the public demonstrates that international institutions may respond to a threatening withdrawal of support by its member states by implementing a set of legitimation strategies. The case study shows how G8 representatives were able to balance the legitimacy demands of members and the public without creating conflict with the legitimacy concerns of its 'borrowed' staff, i.e. its sherpa team. Substantively, these data suggest that the G8 implemented a set of institutional and discursive legitimation strategies to dissolve its negative image of an unrepresentative and ineffective 'circuses without bread'
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. At the core of these strategies were two features of the G8's institutional identity, which had receded into the background: its informality and its work to the benefit of all. In sum, the Group applied three distinct but balanced legitimation strategies which refer not only discursively but also institutionally to the broadly accepted norm of the global common good and which emphasize its capacity to effectively and credibly solve global problems.
In 2012, the G8 implemented an intergovernmental legitimation strategy, reviving an institutional feature which has constantly been appreciated by its members, 98 but has faded away over time due to an ever growing political agenda and 'too much focus on communiques as opposed to building trust between world leaders' 99 ; its informality. By stressing this institutional feature, which cannot easily be provided by other international institutions, the G8 managed to revive its members' commitment to the back to its roots in the spirit of Rambouillet: an intimate gathering of Leaders capable of taking action together on areas of common concern.' 100 By introducing a substantive shift within the institutional structure of the G8 and presenting it as a necessary adaption to maintain the G8's capacity acting to the benefit of all, this 'back-to-basics'-approach reemphasized a core feature of the G8's institutional identity which is of central importance to its member states. In 2013,
Obama's successor Gordon Brown likewise supplemented discursive legitimation by a strategy to increase institutional informality. G8 negotiations were limited to a few topics only, such as "trade, tax, transparency", and the Group introduced an annual report to present its aims and to take stock of the latest G8 year. 101 The new approach also translated into the reduction of negotiation participants to a minimum, a relaxed dress code inviting the leaders to put aside their ties and blazers and to roll up their sleeves, and a much more limited use of decorative materials such as G8 banners or even printed carpets, which formerly dominated the scenery.
Simultaneously, G8 chairs implemented a public legitimation strategy which aimed at highlighting a second feature of its institutional identity; its commitment to the global common good. It was hoped that the stronger emphasis on this traditional feature of the institution's identity would help to transform the G8's public perception of being 'circuses without bread' and increase public support for a responsible, focused, and effective manager of global problems. As noted above, this discursive legitimation strategy is reflected in the replacement of short chair's summaries by a final communiqué, a substantial increase of legitimacy claims in these documents, and the introduction of an annual report. The new formats allowed the G8 to respond in detail to current global affairs and to claim that it is a relevant and legitimate player in global itself from the younger, less "like-minded", and less experienced G20, it also helped to gain support for the more pronounced image of the G8 as an effective facilitator of the global common good.
As part of the G8's bureaucratic legitimation strategy, staff members were still praised in public by the G8 presidencies for their efforts as this did not conflict with intergovernmental and public legitimation strategies. This practice is designed to value the work on the ground and to highlight that the G8 would not be able to fulfill its role without its staff working for the Group's high aspirations. However, staff members did no longer receive presents from the G8 chairs such as stickers and pins with the respective G8 logo which they valued as a 'reward for blood, sweat, and tears'. Although we do not interpret these memorabilia as a legitimation strategy, but rather as a supportive action fostering a sense of belonging, the reduced use of such presents was well compatible with the 'back-to-basics-approach' in three ways: first, it underlined the new public image of a more focused institution by investing less time and money into symbolic practices, including the presentation of gifts to staff members, which formerly resulted in public criticism on the G8's show character. Second, it complemented the reduced use of symbols at summits and, thus, helped to signal the informalization of the Group to member governments. And third, it corresponded to the sherpa teams' demand for a rational-legal proceeding as established for their work within the respective national public services. Accordingly, the head of the British sherpa team in 2013 evaluated the gifts as 'a nice thing to have' that 'shows you've been there (…) and you'll remember it for years and years to come'. But 'in times of austerity', staff members 'just didn't feel it necessary, and how we could then explain that to taxpayers'.
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In sum, the G8 case shows that the concept of legitimation strategies enhances a clearer understanding of international institutions' communication, behavior, and design. The 2008 legitimacy crisis has not only contributed to a transformation of G8 public communication, but was also a driving force of the renewed informalization and transformed agenda of the club. To soften the legitimacy crisis, the G8 came back to its institutional identity as an informal club fostering global development. Its traditional informality was revived and attached to a stronger focus on the global common good which can be gleaned from legitimation claims, the changing agenda subsequent to the financial crisis, and an institutional transformation towards less pomp, less participants, and less bureaucracy. Finally, staff members still express their support for the G8 process -and this not only because their contribution to G8 summits is in line with their work for national public services, but because they believe in the worthiness of the G8 process:
'So clearly we've worked hard, but I'm pretty sure that every single one of us did it because it was a rewarding thing to do, we used our respective expertise and knowledge and skills to deliver what we thought is a good agenda, is a good summit, which reached out to many many people.' 108
The IMF at the center of the Asian financial crisis
We explore the IMF's response to its legitimacy crisis in the late 1990s as an example for an institution which struggled -despite a number of legitimation strategies applied by the Fund's management -for an extended time period with declining support from member states, staff, and the public. The example underlines first, that not only small and weakly institutionalized clubs with a coherent membership like the G8, but also strong international bureaucracies try to bolster their legitimacy in times of crisis.
Second, the analysis shows that the Fund relied heavily on discursive legitimation and that these legitimation claims where not balanced enough to accommodate the conflicting demands of its constituencies of legitimation.
The case study focuses on a time, when the 'existing critiques of the IMF's international crisis management role were given renewed political momentum and greater urgency'. 109 Today, with the help of the G20 and only after extended governance reforms, the IMF appears to have risen 'like a phoenix' 110 , but the process of recovery from the legitimacy crisis of the 1990s has stretched out over more than a decade of declining support from donor and debtor states, the public, and staff. in capital account liberalization and loan conditionality on financial stability, the environment, and labor standards.
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Overall, this legitimacy crisis was not only linked to the Fund's role in the emergence of the Asian crisis, which critics from donor countries like the U.S.
attributed to the IMF's disorderly liberalization of capital accounts, but it also triggered criticism of the negative consequences of loan conditionality for employment, poverty, and social stability. In addition, the Fund has been criticized for its democratic deficit and its limited respect for environmental issues and human rights in debtor countries.
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As a result, the IMF experienced a loss of relevancy from which it was able to recover only a decade later. We claim that this decade of irrelevancy is partly the result of a set of legitimation strategies, which relied heavily on discursive legitimation but relatively little on substantive change and which was not able to balance the conflicting demands of the Fund's constituencies. aware of its precarious legitimacy. The share of statements which refer to the institution's identity and normative purpose grew to an absolute maximum during the late 1990s. Substantively, these data suggest that the IMF implemented a set of mainly discursive legitimation strategies to address the overlapping legitimacy concerns of member governments and the wider public. At the core of these strategies were the norms democratic participation, representation, transparency and social security, which had so far only played a marginal role in the Fund's institutional identity.
To restore the confidence of emerging market economies and to address the concerns of social movements from debtor and creditor countries, the Fund employed a discursive legitimation strategy, which mainly addressed its alleged democratic deficit and limited attention to social security. While the language of transparency, 119 As regards demands from civil society and debtor governments, the management proposed to restructure quotas and voting rights to address the criticism of unfair procedures and to give more voice to developing countries in the formal decision making process. 120 On the project level more deliberative structures were designed to make debtor countries experience more ownership of reform programs and to give more room for social aspects 121 because IMF officials had realized that 'a broad-based social consensus is needed to sustain an IMF programme'.
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As regards public legitimacy, the IMF began to reach out to civil society in borrowing countries 123 
Conclusion
The cases of the G8 and the IMF demonstrate that very different international institutions -ranging from informal clubs to strongly institutionalized bureaucraciesare united in a quest for legitimacy. To pave the way for a systematic empirical analysis of the causes and consequences of these top-down attempts to shape the legitimacy perceptions of different constituencies, this article develops the concept of legitimation strategies, defines its boundaries and delimits three relevant constituencies of legitimation: member states, bureaucratic staff, and the wider public. Following
Weber's empirical understanding of legitimacy and its ascription or withdrawal, we suggest to understand legitimation strategies as goal-oriented activities employed to establish and maintain a reliable basis of diffuse support for a political regime by its constituencies. Our core argument is that international institutions apply different sets of legitimation strategies -ranging from mere rhetoric to substantive institutional adaptation -according to the targeted constituency.
Three main lessons can be drawn from the application of our concept: first, the fact 
